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variable	the	moral	landscape	can	be,	the	less	sure	we	are	entitled	to	be	that	we	know
which	cases	truly	are	the	‘hard	ones’.	If	we	cannot	be	highly	confident	which	cases	are
‘hard	ones’	then	we	cannot	have	strong	reason	to	reject	a	theory	on	the	basis	that	it
miscategorizes	a	hard	case.	Two	reminders	are	in	order.	First,	‘hard	cases’	are	not	here
characterized	in	epistemic	terms,	and	for	reasons	we	have	already	given,	arguments
from	non-obviousness	must	not	rely	on	such	a	characterization.	Secondly,	we	have	not
tried	to	argue	that	arguments	from	non-obviousness	cannot	succeed,	only	that	(p.53)
they	are	characteristically	weak.	The	reason	for	this	can	be	put	simply:	The	less	obvious
morality	is,	the	less	obvious	it	should	be	what	is	morally	obvious.
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